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FOREWORD

In this monograph, Dr. Geoffrey Demarest addresses
what—at first glance—seems to be an esoteric and
inconsequential issue. The mapping of Colombian national
territory, however, is fundamental to the problem of control
of national territory. As a threshold matter, policy, strategy,
and military asset management in contemporary conflict in
virtually any unstable part of the world must deal with the
problem of governance in “lawless areas.” Unless a central
government such as that in Colombia can exert legitimate
control and governance in the 60+ percent of the
municipalities not under its control, there can be no
effective judicial system and rule of law; no effective legal
crop substitution programs; no effective democratic
processes; and, only very little military or police action to
bring law and order into unknown and difficult terrain.
Indeed, control of the national territory is a strategic
paradigm for 21st century conflict. The state is under
assault by a powerful combination of state weaknesses,
“lawless areas,” and insurgent and criminal terrorism. All
these contributors to instability and violence have a powerful effect on local, regional, national, and international
security. As a consequence, this monograph is extremely
salient. Colombia and other states experiencing conflicts
that range from criminal anarchy to virtual civil war must
understand that putting treasure and blood into a conflict
situation without first establishing the strategic
foundations of success only result in ad hoc, piece-meal,
disjointed, and ineffective reactions to truly inconsequential problems.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join with the
North-South Center in offering this monograph as part of
our ongoing attempt to recognize and respond to the
strategic realities of the current security situation in the
Western Hemisphere, and reframe Plan Colombia and
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related policy and strategy in a more workable context. This
is critically important to the vital interests of the United
States, Colombia, the hemisphere, and the entire global
community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PREFACE

For the past 2 years, the Strategic Studies Institute and
the North-South Center have engaged in an effort to bring
creative thinking and analysis to the most challenging
security problem in the Americas, the multifaceted conflicts
in Colombia. This monograph by Dr. Geoffrey Demarest
looks at an important issue, property rights, as bearing
directly on the inability of Colombia to assert authority over
its entire territory as well as to implement the social agenda
of Plan Colombia.
The author appropriately cites the much-discussed
latest work of Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital.
The Peruvian economist makes a strong case that
development in less-developed countries does not take
place, in large measure, not because the poor lack assets but
because without recognized property rights they are unable
to mobilize them. In Haiti alone, says de Soto, “the poorest
nation in Latin America, the total assets of the poor are
more than one hundred fifty times greater than all the
foreign investment received since Haiti’s independence
from France in 1804.”1
In Colombia, Demarest points out in detail, large areas
of the country are not even mapped. The implications, he
points out, are enormous in terms of the government’s
ability to deal with criminality as well as its ability to offer
alternative development to combat reliance of the
campesinos on coca cultivation. As for the support of Plan
Colombia by the U.S. Government, he makes the case that
such aid and the planning for it cannot properly be made in
the absence of adequate information concerning property
ownership and use.

1 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, New York: Basic Books,
2000; p. 5.
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The importance of property ownership, of course, is not
lost on the FARC guerrillas, who aspire to become
landowners, control territory, and collect “taxes.” In my own
experience, I spoke with a Colombian whose farm in the rich
Cauca Valley was sold under duress and through proper
notarial act, to presumed FARC agents. The cash payment
for the land was confiscated from him in Cali shortly after
the sale by accomplices of the new owner (whereupon he
took the next plane for Miami and safety.)
Nevertheless, the author makes the valid point that to
succeed both in counternarcotics as well as the suppression
of lawlessness, an indispensable starting point is the
knowledge of ownership and value of land. He argues
convincingly that the continuation of large amounts of
informally owned and unregulated land are major
impediments to progress. The objective, a “stronger
Colombian State with a visible commitment not just to
security but also to civil rights and open government” will be
the result of dealing with the land problem.
This monograph is a valuable contribution to an
understanding of the Colombian dilemma and should be
read by policymakers.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.
Director
The Dante B. Fascell
North-South Center
University of Miami
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SUMMARY

This monograph highlights a shortcoming of U.S. and
Colombian efforts attempted thus far to contain and reduce
organized crime and terrorist violence in Colombia. Both
governments acknowledge the importance that property
rights play in long-term state legitimacy and in the
short-term restraint of organized criminality. Nevertheless,
inattentiveness to the condition of property rights,
especially in rural areas, is both a cause and effect of a
fundamental omission bearing on military operations:
Colombia is not well-mapped, some of it not at all. For
decades soldiers have been sent out to patrol in unmapped
areas. This military inadequacy is overshadowed, however,
by longer-term social implications. The country cannot hope
to establish the rule of law without extending effective,
formal land ownership, which implies creation of the maps
and registries attendant to that ownership. While
immediate military victory may be achieved without
comprehensive mapping, establishment of a lasting,
peaceful social order is unlikely. Ironically, in 1997 the
United States removed its liaison to the Colombian national
cartographic institute—one milestone of a transcendent
failure to identify as essential the work of that piece of
government. Cartographic inadequacy has weakened
effective response to what has been (perhaps wrongly) the
U.S. national preoccupation in Colombia—countering the
industry of illicit drugs. U.S. programs have not been
informed regarding who owns the land on which heroin
poppy or coca is grown, or even what factors bear on the
value of that land. Also overlooked is the powerful nexus
between poorly enforced property rights and the violation of
human rights. Good maps and registries are an essential
tool for understanding the specific linkages between
economics and land ownership, between land ownership
and terrain control, and between control of terrain and
terror. Property maps help define and visualize the vague
ix

geographic boundary between lawlessness and civilization.
Incomplete mapping, beyond hamstringing military
operations against guerrillas and illegal paramilitaries,
puts Colombia’s social, economic, and security objectives at
risk. And to the extent this is true for Colombia, it is all the
more a reality in other countries of the hemisphere where
property records are even less well-developed.

x

MAPPING COLOMBIA: THE CORRELATION
BETWEEN LAND DATA AND STRATEGY

War is God’s way of teaching geography.
Attributed to George Carlin

Bountiful Property.
Colombia’s extravagant geography guides decisionmaking in that country more than in most. The history of
Colombian conflict is a record of competition for control of
lands and movement routes related to export products or
their taxation.1 Rebels, pirates, and their hybrids, arrayed
against the Colombian state and each other, have forever
fought over control of product sources, transportation
routes, taxation, and fiscal policies bearing on Colombia’s
natural bounty.2 While the current civil conflict differs in
significant ways from those of the past, the correlation of
outlaw strategies to agricultural and mineral geography is
the same, often exactly the same.3 Leaders of today’s
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP or
FARC), Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and Auto
Defenses Unificados de Colombia (AUC) intimately are
aware of the effects that the control of “place” has on profit
and on prospects for their long-term organizational health.4
Like the classic combat commanders, the Alexanders and
Napoleons, a successful outlaw strategist recognizes the
critical advantage of choosing favorable fighting terrain,
protecting his lines of communication (LOCs) and
compromising those of his enemy. In Colombia, he must also
be sensitive to the relative commercial and industrial value
of property and movement routes. Likewise, a winning
government strategy to defeat an organized outlawry, or for
that matter to establish long-term social peace, must
recognize and respect the incremental worth of land. Even
as a question of military strategy, Colombia’s terrain should
1

be considered both in terms of maneuverability and
according to specific material value. This reflects a
d i ffer en c e b et we e n i n te r n al ar m e d c o n f l i c t an d
international war generally. In an internal war such as that
being waged in Colombia, land is not only the space over
which combat materiel might move, or firefights occur, it is
also the engine of disposable wealth and wellspring of the
war-making strength of all contending forces.5 The FARC
may destroy a bridge or a high-tension tower, but is unlikely
to destroy a bridge over which its own taxable products are
moved.
Moreover, the performance grade given internationally
to Colombia’s armed forces always includes a human rights
component, yet it is failure on the part of the Colombian
State to give meaning to property rights that has led to
human rights violations. If the Colombian armed forces are
ever to clarify the human rights issue in their favor, they
must better understand the contract between citizens and
government that is called “property.”
Dosn’t thou ‘ear my ‘erse’s legs, as they canters awaäy,
Proputty, proputty, proputty—that’s what I ‘ears ‘em saäy.
Proputty, proputty, proputty—Sam, thou’s an ass for thy
paaïns; Theer’s moor sense i’ one o’ ‘is legs, nor in all thy
braaïns.6
Alfred Tennyson
from “The Northern Farmer” (new style)

Paradoxically, a vast and growing public record exists in
Colombia to measure the insidious invasion of lawlessness
throughout the country. Perhaps to the reader’s surprise,
millions of Colombians claim ownership of land parcels, an
ownership formally recognized in one of five cadastre
systems (recorded property surveys and accompanying
economic descriptions) and a separate national land
ownership registry. A typical cadastral map of platted
properties is shown in Figure 1.7 The cadastres, principal of
which is maintained by the Instituto Geográfico Augustín
Codazzi (IGAC, the nation’s cartographic institute) have
2

existed more or less in their present form since 1940, and
they include most rural and urban claims from the
mountains west. Aside from their central role in equitable
tax appraisal, the national cadastre is today recognized as a
fundamental source of information for growth and
conservation planning.8

Figure 1. Typical 1:10,000 Scale Colombian
Cadastral Map.9
Developmental planners believe that protection of
p r op er t y r i g h t s t h r o u g h f o r m al do c u m e n tati o n ,
administrative transparency, and insurance will make a
long-term material difference in much of the world. The
fullest expression of this developmental belief can be read in
Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital.10 De Soto
extends a line of free-market theory outlined in his earlier
bestseller, The Other Path, for which he first gained
international recognition.11 De Soto and his team of
researchers exhaustively documented that for the poor to
advance materially, they need to be able to create capital,
3

and that in most developing countries they cannot. The
reason for this inability to create capital can in part be found
in a lack of formalized property regimes—the kind that in
advanced economies surveys, records, protects, insures, and
represents property rights of all kinds. The result of a
failure to create precise, reliable documentation of property
rights, property courts, title insurance, brokerage laws, and
the like, is an invisible world of dead capital—assets worth
literally and measurably trillions of dollars, but which
cannot attract investment. De Soto’s perspective is a
powerful, unavoidable challenge to any developmental
strategy or project that does not embrace the question of
broad-based capital formation. Furthermore, it has created
an intellectual environment in which openness and
availability of reliable land ownership data (popularly
referred to as “transparency”) is assumed to be a necessary
condition for the success of economic development
projects.12 Even traditional redistributive land reform
proposals depend for their success on the fidelity and
openness of ownership documentation. As a result of this
developmentalist acceptance of the cadastre as a central
institution and organizational technology for progress, a
great deal of money has been devoted to extending and
modernizing cadastral systems, including in Colombia.
The land records in Colombia can be used to trace
ownership to national identification numbers and then to
passports, telephone bills, etc. The application of land
information for cross-referencing databases is doubly
attractive because land records have inherent stability and
reliability. People do, of course, cheat the records, often to
avoid taxes, but such cheating is self-limiting, and can
actually be helpful to law enforcement. The special
characteristic of land records resides in the ultimate need of
an owner to prove his identity in quiet-title court actions
(actions in court to establish ownership). Since property is a
contract with the state for the recognition and support of
specific preferential rights, an ostensible owner cannot
pretend he is someone else for very long, or indeed his
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ownership preference will disappear. At any rate, the use of
cutouts or dummy-owners is a red flag for the detective.
There is rarely a legitimate reason to pretend someone else
is the owner of your land.
While the forensic value of land ownership data is
relatively obvious, not so obvious is the correlation between
land data and military strategy, but this correlation
precisely marks an essential attribute of successful
counterinsurgent campaigns. A few illustrations will help.
The Colombian FARC maintains wide dispersion of its
subordinate units.13 This is done not only for reasons related
to the autonomous, obstreperous nature of guerrilla
commanders, but also as a method to deny the Colombian
army the opportunity for battles of annihilation. For the
60-odd FARC fronts organized into seven blocks, logistics is
a primary occupation. For some fronts the most lucrative
activity may be taxation of coca farmers, but in others
perhaps the control of kidnapping contractors, or movement
of weapons is more important. The fronts are also
encouraged toward the FARC’s strategic objective of
controlling urban centers. To achieve this, FARC fronts
work toward systematically influencing and eventually
controlling movement corridors (lines of communication)
into assigned cities.14 Some cities, such as Medellín in
Antioquia Department, are susceptible to being choked and
extorted because their mountainous environs so constrict
access.15 Much of the combat responsibility, as well as
maintenance of discipline among the fronts, falls to mobile
columns, which have a wider geographic range.
In order to maximize security and for economy of force,
the FARC created networks of movement corridors within
the blocks, and mobility corridors between the blocks. Some
of t h es e r ou t es f o l l o w s t an dar d r o ad an d r i v e r
transportation infrastructure and are used to move large
quantities of illicit product. Secondary routes are more often
used for the movement of units and materiel. In
mountainous areas it is common that the routes follow
ridgelines. The FARC has worked to control owners and
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ownership of properties all along the movement and
mobility corridors (it is suspected that this is especially true
along remote ridge line routes), thus helping to assure
operational security. Lately, the FARC is known to have
assisted in the formalization of property holdings by
peasants under their direct control in active drug
cultivation areas, one being the Puerto Leguísimo area in
Putumayo. 16 Additionally, that the guerrillas have
effectively purchased mineral mines has been rumored.
Labor tactics, selective extortion, and bribery can be
supported by using cutouts to gain control of licenses or by
surrounding publicly-owned mineral extraction sites with
peasant clients and then formalizing the ownership of those
properties.17
When the Colombian army reentered San Vicente
Caguan in the former clearance zone in February 2002, it
found that fleeing FARC units destroyed government
offices, with the exception of the land registry office.18 The
records of land ownership did not show a rash of takings by
the guerrillas and, apparently, land values had not changed
appreciably (although they were extremely low to begin
with). In Puerto Leguísimo, the local FARC commander
accepted letters of introduction from the government to
permit workers of the cartographic institute to complete
cadastral formation for hundreds of agricultural properties
in the area under FARC’s immediate control. One has to ask
why the FARC would be willing to have the government
formalize property ownership. The answer is troubling,
considering the natural inference that the Colombian
government was involved in some level of accessorial
behavior. If the FARC has control of the occupiers, it can
enforce a sharecropping relationship, force sale or
mortgage, tax, etc., all the while using governmentprovided records to facilitate and legitimatize its actions. It
also acquires options if the area is overtaken by government
troops or by another outlaw entity. In case of some interim
or final negotiated settlement, the outlaw leadership has
put in place the basis of legally controlling population and
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territory, the population controlled by feudal connections to
the land, and the land controlled by a client population. The
guerrilla leader thereby succeeds in becoming a great
landowner, or terrateniente.19
The FARC does not enjoy widespread mass support in
the Colombian population, even in rural areas. It has,
however, carefully proselytized or terrorized in select
locales related to its nation-wide, logistics-based strategy.
Meanwhile, the AUC, a newer force, appears to have a
varied and growing popular support base greatly exceeding
that of the FARC—but less so along many of the movement
corridors for which the AUC and guerrillas fight. Apposite
to the property discussion is AUC heritage, the organization
having been born of the frustration of ranchers at the failure
of the government to protect their rural properties from the
FARC.
Conceivably, the historical and geographic bases of the
struggle between the FARC and the AUC could be painted
using existing cadastral maps by tracing back to a handful
of ranch properties. The property-based origins and
purposes of the AUC logically drive it to augment formal
ownership of land in areas it considers strategically
important. This is not only true of rural areas. Recent urban
combat among the FARC, AUC, ELN and lesser groups in
the city of Medellín seem to attest to the selective
importance of commercial property and its relationship to
rural terrain. Recent urban combat between outlaw groups
in Medellín broke out over control of the major land route to
the Urabá Gulf and Atrato River Valley lowlands to the
northwest.20 The Urubá/Atrato area represents a major
illicit logistics corridor. If the corridor were better controlled
by the government, the fighting in Medellín would logically
not have occurred. Urban contests between outlaw groups
would be obviated if control of key military and commercial
terrain in the rural region to the northwest belonged to the
government. To attain control, the government will have to
pursue a strategy that recognizes land ownership as a key
information element. Formal, visible, and protected
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property rights should be the foundation of long-term
government presence in the area of Colombia facing
Panama. Until that is achieved, the area will be outlaw in
all respects, and Medellín will continue to suffer periodic
violent eruptions. Meanwhile, the people of the
Urubá/Atrato lowlands are likely to continue suffering
forced displacements and mass killings.21
Along the same general axis in Antioquia, a secondary
network of rural transportation routes runs through the
Dabeiba, Peque, and Ituango municipalities to the west of
the Cauca River. It is a major confrontation area between
the AUC and the guerrillas. Warfare imposed and suffered
in this mountainous subregion encapsulates the nature of
the conflict in Colombia. Almost all combat, human rights
cases, and criminal encounters relate to the dominance of
passage routes used for illicit purposes. Putting a stop to
intra-outlaw combat in the area will require a greater
presence of government military force to physically deny
use of the zone’s passes for illicit product shipment.
Pacifying the region in the long-term may require a change
in the mix and quality of real property ownership. Few
proven treatments exist for the kind of social poisoning that
years of ruthless competition for the control of land causes,
but one antidote is to redistribute populations and property
ownership. The Colombian government may decide to
embark on programs changing ownership of land in local
areas most affected by the violence, perhaps by empowering
ethnic communities and better securing communal land
rights, or perhaps by encouraging private ownership by
persons and organizations more likely and capable of
resisting outlaw incursions. Regardless of the details, any
land-oriented part of a solution will depend for integrity on
precise, electronically available, complete records of
ownership interests at key locations. Precision lends
juridical strength to the documentation, as well as future
market confidence. Electronic availability (transparency)
helps protect the ownership documentation against fraud
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and corruption, and allows individuals and nongovernmental organizations to monitor land policies.
The value of terrain for illicit uses is heightened in many
locales, like the Peque-Ituango passes; nevertheless, many
properties will be abandoned or subject to forfeiture. These
need to be identified in detail, but they also need to be visible
at a strategic level so that the evolution of ownership serves
a peace-intending initiative of the government rather than
outlaw competitiveness. If the government does not mount a
national property strategy that helps placate the cycle of
violence, property strategies mounted by outlaw groups will
continue to catalyze it.
In Colombia the terrain calculus is intricate and local,
each hectare presenting its own mix of military and
economic value. Reconciling the two (what we might call the
maneuver view of terrain and the economic view) for the
purpose of shaping strategy is crucial. Fortunately, the
government of Colombia, with U.S. assistance, can produce
a comprehensive, detailed database of Colombian land use
and ownership. To understand the specific utility of such a
map, especially for the formation of military strategy, some
foundational assertions are offered regarding what makes
one piece of land more valuable than another.
A suburban American real estate broker might quip that
three factors contribute to the square-meter value of a piece
of property—location, location, and location.22 Of course,
location dominates the value of Colombian rural land as
well, even more so if we allow the definition to encompass
productivity factors such as climate, soil, and rainfall.
However, and this is the part that is too often overlooked,
the single most important determinant of the value of real
property is not its location, but rather the mix of theoretical
rights associated with the land, along with the practical
expression those rights are given through government
endorsement. This is not an abstract comment on political
philosophy. The market price of a piece of land depends on
the contents of the basket of rights being sold. If we want to
9

sell Granddad’s farm in American suburbia, we will get less
for it if there is an easement for a power line across it, or if
there is a zoning ordinance disallowing commercial
construction, etc. The farm’s longitude and latitude are
important, but not as important as the mix of rights
associated with the sale. Property is not a thing; it is not dirt
in a place; it is the set of rights that regulates relations of
persons to places. Just listing and formalizing the
understanding of those rights, however, is not enough to
give them their entire value. If the police cannot or will not
prevent the use of an empty lot as a place where drug
dealers convene, the market value of the houses nearby may
plummet. If potential buyers of a Colombian farm cannot
travel the road to the farm without the likelihood of being
assaulted or kidnapped, the farm’s market value will be
almost nil.
The value of land speaks volumes about the degree to
which rights are established, recorded, and enforced. The
market for property describes in detail what an internal war
does to the essential contract between government and the
population.23 That contract is supposed to be one in which
the government creates the possibility of property. In other
words, when the contract has practical effect, people can
obtain a set of preferential rights, enforceable by the
government and associated with a specific place. When the
contract is not functioning, property is reduced by degree to
the base state of possession by force. When that occurs,
those in control of the most force are the most lords of the
land.
Aside from their importance for capital formation and
economic opportunity, formalized land records are
becoming a central theme within the study of violence.24 An
increasing number of scholars recognize that those polities
enjoying formalized, consistent property regimes are less
likely to suffer internal conflict than those where
informality in property ownership reigns.25 Furthermore,
the existence of formalized and maintained land records
offers a variety of forensic possibilities especially related to
10

illicit use of terrain and to large sophisticated criminal
enterprises, to wit, narcoguerrillas. A more highly
developed property regime, in other words, would support
all U.S. Government and Colombian visions of changing the
underlying social and juridical conditions conducive to
violence, diminishing Colombia’s role as a producer and
exporter of illicit crops, and improving the overall material
well-being of the citizenry.
Putumayo Coca Eradication and the World War II
Raid on Ploesti.
As a central tactic in U.S. counternarcotics strategy in
Colombia (a dimension that was reinforced rather than
diminished after the changeover to the administration of
President Alvaro Uribe), aerial eradication merits special
attention in the context of the property rights focus of this
monograph. It is a conclusion that aerial eradication, like all
counternarcotics and counterterror efforts in Colombia, will
be less effective outside the context of a property-based
overall strategy.
Allied war planners felt that a decisive raid on the
Romanian oil fields around Ploesti could be a knock-out
blow, possibly crippling German warmaking capacity and
shortening the course of World War II in Europe. 26
Churchill called the Ploesti fields, producing more than half
the crude oil imported into Germany, the taproot of the Nazi
war machine. An ensuing operation on August 1, 1943, was
costly—54 of 177 of the B-24 Liberators sent on the raid did
not return, giving the raid its nickname, Black Sunday.
There was no knockout blow at Ploesti; the immediate
results were insubstantial, and, in terms of the overall
outcome of World War II, the effectiveness of the raids is
still debated. A resilient, determined enemy took
countermeasures and found alternatives. Eventually, Nazi
use of Romanian oil had been reduced by as much as 85
percent by the time the Russians occupied the fields in 1945.
Hurting the Nazi resource base was a good idea, and the oil
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bombing campaigns did speed the end of the war. The Battle
of the Bulge, in which the final German offense stalled for
lack of fuel, is an oft-cited proof. However, starving the Nazi
war machine of Romanian oil was as effectively
accomplished by railhead interdiction and destroying
rolling stock as it was by bombing production facilities in the
oil fields themselves.27 The overall air effort in Europe can
be said to have been most effective when it supported major
allied ground operations by interdicting Wehrmacht
operational reserves. The air campaigns had to be part of a
broad effort that correctly identified various critical
vulnerabilities and attacked as many as possible. For Nazi
Germany to be defeated, the Allies had to close with and
destroy the Wehrmacht on the ground.
Plan Colombia’s Putumayo aerial eradication was a bit
like the raid on Ploesti. The spray planes did not suffer a
Black Sunday, but the strategies are analogous in that our
massive aerial attack against the dense and extensive
Putumayo coca crop was supposed to cause grave harm to
the FARC’s cocaine-based financial health—just as the raid
on Ploesti was to deprive the Nazi war machine of its
supposed lifeblood. The strategy identified Putumayo,
hardly the geographic center of gravity of the war in the
traditional military sense, as the locus of a significant
amount of the FARC’s overall warmaking strength. The
long-term value of eradication spraying may, like the
Ploesti raid, be ambiguous. Spraying achieves the
immediately visible result of knocking out a lot of noxious
and fiscally valuable vegetation. The extent to which the
outlaws shifted to other income sources, protected other
crop areas, dispersed cultivation, replanted, shipped from
storage, increased kidnapping and oil extortion, exerted
political pressure to end the spraying, or took other
countermeasures will remain difficult to precisely
calculate.28 Outlaw countermeasures, however, beg the
next question: How do we readjust when it appears that
aerial eradication has achieved what it can, and yet the
outlaw calculus in Colombia does not appear to have
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sufficiently changed as a result? Aerial eradication makes it
a little more difficult for the FARC, the ELN and the AUC to
fund their respective wars, but they will do so.
Strategy is best devised when resources, method, and
objective can all be reconciled at the outset. That is to say,
there is no sense entering into a project undercapitalized or
without a reasonable goal. A military strategy,
furthermore, must support the larger political strategy. In
these respects, the Putumayo portion of Plan Colombia was
strategically correct. Given the amount of political and
financial capital available, and given restraints (some
artificial) as to the use of military resources, it was logical
and appropriate to have identified Putumayo as the locus of
U.S. assistance efforts—at the time. In 1999, crop surveys
and remote sensor images of Colombian coca cultivation
showed a dense blob in Putumayo department, while other
maps showed something else. Guerrilla activity, displaced
persons, land mine injuries, or almost any other indicators
of internal conflict over the previous 10 years indicated that
Putumayo was not at the center of Colombia’s warfare.29
The department was peripheral to “counterinsurgency,”
and yet central to coca production. It was a place where the
U.S. military could provide assistance while satisfying the
politically preferable, if practically ludicrous, distinction
between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics.
Providentially, the Putumayo target selection was useful in
another way. Putumayo lays between the zone ceded by the
government (at the time known as the despeje) to the FARC
and Sucumbios Province in Ecuador, an area used by the
FARC as a cross-border support sanctuary. The Putumayo
operation, in effect, increased government military
presence across a major FARC line of communication.30 It is
not surprising that a map showing arms smuggling routes
into Colombia at the time of the War of the Thousand Days
at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries would be
strikingly similar to a current map of the same theme.31
Among the ancient smuggling routes are the same crossings
into Sucumbios, Ecuador that appear to have formed a
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major FARC line of communication that included
pre-provisioned encampments for hundreds of fighters.
Neither the Black Sunday raid on Ploesti nor Putumayo
eradication were abject failures, even if they were not
decisive blows. The costly experience at Ploesti led to better
planned and executed follow-on operations that evolved
with the broader counter oil strategy. Like Ploesti, the oil
field targeting may have been the result of the obvious. That
is to say, like the coca blobs of Colombia, oil field infrastructure stuck out in aerial photos, prompting a planning
momentum too impatient for the painstaking identification
of less dramatic and more disperse transportation nodes
and infrastructure. Had there been a methodology in place
able to precisely scale the relative economic-military value
of European terrain, then perhaps the Ploesti fields
themselves might never have been rated as an optimal
target as compared, say, to railheads. In Colombia, while
drug traffickers will use all means at their disposal for
product shipment, cost constraints have them employ roads
and rivers, probably in a measure consistent with the
carrying capacity of the route.
The Putumayo eradication strategy recognized a place in
Colombia as particularly valuable economically to the
outlaw enemy, and therefore a valuable military target.
Fortunately, the eradication plan also assisted the
government in compromising a major enemy line of
communication (LOC). Unfortunately, the Putumayo spray
plan, like the Ploesti bombing raid, was not based on a
sufficient understanding of the relative economic value of
terrain as a targeting guide. For instance, little was done,
upon looking at the crop extension blobs, to find out in detail
who owned the land on which those blobs appeared. Perhaps
planners incorrectly assumed that all the land was
no-man’s land, or that knowledge of personal ownership
was unavailable or unreliable. Furthermore, the Putumayo
plan neglected to identify terrain that might have been
more important in the overall value of the product than the
fields themselves. The importance of the coca plant was
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perhaps over-rated as an ingredient in the commercial
value of cocaine. Consider another widely available product
on which there can be some physical dependency—water.
Bottled water is an extremely lucrative enterprise in the
United States, and, as some note with chagrin, bottled
water can sell for more money than the soft drink on the
shelf next to it, even if the store has a public water fountain.
This makes one question the value of sugar, but neither
should we be fooled into thinking the price is associated with
the quality of the H2O. The plastic in the bottle is not worth
much either. If we wish to choke off water profits from some
ill-doing water trafficker, we might try drying up the
sources of water, perhaps because we can identify an
offending lake or water main. Still, that strategy seems
unlikely to succeed. It would be more efficient to knock off
the truck on the way to the store. Where is the most valuable
geography in the bottled water industry? It is not the lake,
but the bottling plant or some point on the road to the
convenience store. The value of bottled water is the fact that
it is found in a portable form in the convenience store, not
that it is water. While this analogy is soon overdrawn, the
question it highlights regarding relative geographic
value—route vs. ingredient source—is valid.
The centerpiece of recent U.S. counternarcotics strategy
in Colombia has been eradication, and, as argued earlier,
this has not been an irrational approach. However, given
that the impact of eradication efforts is likely to diminish
over time in accordance with outlaw reactions, eradication
should not constitute the concept around which U.S.
counternarcotics in Colombia evolves. On the other hand,
eradication programs can increase in effectiveness within
the right strategic context and supported by the right kinds
of intelligence. The selection of what and when to eradicate
must be better informed, and the logic made more
transparent. Aerial eradication, especially to the extent it is
identified with the United States, should be armored
against criticism of targeting decisions by incorporating
absolute detail regarding land ownership, along with public
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transparency regarding the targeting decisions. It is now
practicable to establish a matrix of use, ownership quality,
and applicable law that can indicate the most appropriate
method and timing for eradication of illicit crops even in
areas where minifundios (very small land holdings)
dominate. Such data can also be used to reveal anomalies in
market prices, ownership interests by outlaw organizations, and hidden political or familial associations, the
ignorance of which might warp eradication decisions. It also
provides legal and technical justification for taxation policy.
Much of the information can be obtained now, although
basic cartography, surveying, and registry will have to be
accomplished in many areas where illicit cultivation is
pronounced.
Giving Property Away.
In 1999, to find a way out of what the Colombian
government claimed was an impasse, Colombian President
Andrés Pastrana agreed to concede to the FARC a piece of
Colombian territory the size of Switzerland. The
government withdrew forces from the area as an assurance
of security in order to resume another round of peace
negotiations. The results were dubious: in 3 years the FARC
gave up nothing, and in the meantime exploited the natural
military advantages of safely occupying a huge zone
situated near the heart of the country.32 Protected interior
lines allowed the FARC to increase its effective presence in
areas around the zone, expanding the territory under its
control.33 It especially helped secure the FARC’s southern
line of communication out of Colombia into Ecuador and
Peru. Within the despeje (clearing) as the area was called,
the FARC was able to hide and manage its inventory of
hostages, accelerate terrorist training and even
manufacture bombs and mines. In fact, three Irish
Republican Army (IRA) members were captured in
Colombia after having provided training to FARC members
there.34
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By 2001, as it became obvious that the land concession to
the FARC was a huge failure, the Colombian president
prepared to give an even more valuable zone to the smaller
ELN. 35 Aside from dominating the most important
transportation route in the country, the proposed zone,
commonly known as the Magdalena Medio (Middle
Magdalena), included a major coca crop concentration, as
well as oil-industry infrastructure. Asked by a newsperson
about his decision, Pastrana answered, “The country needs
to understand that the ELN is prepared to make peace, but
if it doesn’t happen, it is prepared to make war. And it has a
great terrorist capacity.” 36 In a nutshell, a national
president stated that his countrymen must simply resign
themselves to the fact of capitulation; if the Colombian
president did not offer up the most important corner of the
country to a group of outlaws, that group would hurt
Colombian citizens.
The Magdalena River runs generally south to north
between Colombia’s central and eastern mountain ranges to
the Atlantic coast. It is the single most important
transportation corridor in Colombia and the principal
artery to Bogotá. The middle reaches of the Magdalena have
always been of particular strategic value, and are more so
today because of a concentration of oil industry
infrastructure. The southern bulb of Bolivar Department is
home to a huge coca crop concentration. In recent years, the
area has been a battleground between the AUC and the
ELN, with the AUC apparently having gained the upper
hand. To dominate the area would be doubly advantageous
for the ELN. Impunity in the zone would have allowed
uncontested access to the favorite object of extortion for that
group: petroleum infrastructure. Proximity to taxable coca
harvests, as well as major transportation routes, makes it a
near-perfect staging area for taxation and kidnapping
sorties. Physical dominion in the zone would also have given
the ELN a spatial advantage in terms of attacking into the
heartland area of the AUC to the west. Incredibly, and in
light of no appreciable benefit to the nation from the
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experiment with the FARC’s despeje, President Pastrana
pushed to concede three counties to the ELN, two in the
southernmost tip of Bolivar department and one in
Antioquia just to the south of the others.37 A militarily more
valuable piece of ground could hardly have been chosen. The
government plan to concede the area was blocked by
protests from local residents, the inability of the
government to deliver possession to the ELN because of
AUC assertions, and perhaps indirectly because of the
perception shift created by the September 11 attacks.38
The Middle Magdalena has been prized territory for
hundreds of years.39 Assuring that the reaches of the Middle
Magdalena are strategically denied to an enemy is one of the
basic elements of Colombian military history, whoever the
contestants. Trying to give it away is an anomaly. The
Colombian government’s move to engage the ELN in peace
talks by way of ceding such a militarily critical place is hard
to fathom. One is led to suppose that President Pastrana
and his advisors assigned more power and terrorist capacity
to the ELN than it actually had, were overly committed to
the concept of negotiation, were under some unspoken
duress, sympathized with the guerrillas or simply did not
understand. While the AUC is a drug trafficking, terrorist
organization that the government must defeat, it may have
been strategically fortuitous for the government that the
AUC rejected ELN occupation of the Middle Magdalena.
Comprehending the value and ownership of land as a
function of divisible rights, rather than simple location,
could offer a unique perspective on President Pastrana’s
policy. If the world had a map detailing particularized
ownership interests in the Middle Magdalena, a whole new
realm of understanding might attend the Pastrana position.
If it were possible to view the whole picture of preferential
rights in land that would have been transferred or
jeopardized by a concession to the ELN, a better
understanding might emerge of what was at stake. Most of
the land in the region is privately owned and has been
appraised.40 Why there is an isolated blob of coca cultivation
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and how that cultivation relates geographically to oil
industry licenses and concessions should be of particular
interest. These questions are not posed out of historical
curiosity. The land remains under coca, and is still under
outlaw dominance. It is possible, however, to obtain and
display detailed ownership data for this region.
A president giving land away to outlaws in huge chunks
is a rare occurrence. More common is programmatic
give-away. Land reform, and especially agrarian reform,
has been a staple of developmental and redistributive
campaigns in Colombia for many years. Since 1962 more
than 1,700,000 hectares of land ceded to, bought or
expropriated by the national government has been turned
over to campesinos and tribal peoples. 41 More than
18,000,000 acres of government open land has also been
redistributed.42 Curiously, while this seems to be a great
deal of land, officials from the national agrarian reform
institute (Incora) state that the distribution of land
ownership in Colombia remains radically inequitable.43 The
validity of the observation may be the subject of
considerable economic and social debate, but it is a debate
conducted in the absence of needed data regarding what
happened to all the redistributed land. Incora is able to
show almost every acre of land distributed to whom and
when. What it apparently cannot show, at least for
redistributions done until the last few years, is exactly
where. The Incora mandate has been to redistribute land,
not to keep track of what was redistributed. For that reason,
most Incora records indicate a precision of location only
down to the county level. Apparently there has also not been
any systematic effort done to determine the consequences of
ownership or divestment during more than 40 years of
redistributive activity.
Without asserting that the Incora land redistribution
has been a failure or has contributed to violence, it is at least
fair to say that the effect of programmed redistributions is
speculative. Today, it is technically possible, using
commercially available software, to match the Incora
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database with cadastral and registry databases to
determine the ownership results of the Incora programs
and, more interestingly, to see what the geographic
correlation of the redistribution programs has been to the
incidence of violence in the countryside. It appears that
some of the Incora land may have been redistributed more
than once, especially in lawless areas.
Military Options.
At the time of this writing, it appears that counterterror
has displaced counternarcotics at center stage in our policy
toward Colombia.44 Accordingly, one supposes that our
principal military objective in Colombia is not to help reduce
the amount of illicit drugs leaving the country. Now it is to
establish the security conditions necessary for the
development of an allied country where liberty and property
are protected, and where material progress is a reasonable
expectation for the majority. If this does not misrepresent
the dominant current of U.S. policy, it means we are back in
the business of assisting an ally with internal security.
Countering illicit drugs becomes a subordinate mission, but
remains an indispensable objective. The Uribe Velez
administration has set Colombia on a course toward
defeating the FARC and ELN. How his administration will
deal with the AUC is less certain. By the time this
monograph is published, the Congress of the United States
may have formally acceded to the idea that counternarcotics
monies be spent on counterguerrilla endeavors of the
Colombian armed forces.
The question remains if stopping narco-trafficking
should be our main contribution to defeating the outlaws, or
if we should launch headlong into counterterrorism. Loss of
drug income would logically accelerate the demise of any of
the outlaw groups. Still, while true that the outlaws benefit
militarily from drug income, trafficking in drugs is not their
only source of financial strength. Reducing coca production
might reduce the overall terror capacity of the FARC, but
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destroying the FARC would logically have a greater impact
on the coca industry. Maybe U.S.-Colombia strategy has
been inside out. U.S. counternarcotics efforts have been
counterguerrilla to the extent they have been based on the
theory that, by reducing drug income from Putumayo coca,
the FARC would be weakened and therefore encouraged to
yield in peace negotiations. At least part of the idea was to
harm the traffickers by reducing their profits. Now we will
attempt to reduce the amount of product by more directly
harming the traffickers. Which would be more efficient,
reducing traffickers by eradicating drugs or reducing the
drug flow by eradicating traffickers? A change toward the
latter could indeed prove more effective in decreasing the
quantity of illicit drugs sent to the United States from
Colombia, but the optimal contribution that the United
States can make toward ridding Colombia of its outlaw
enemies may still be to proceed on the basis of a primarily
counternarcotics strategy. This leads to another subquestion: If the United States is to contribute to the Colombian
government’s prosecution of the war by way of counternarcotics programs, is aerial eradication an optimal use of
counternarcotics money? If, in fact, it is better to
de-emphasize eradication and instead create a system of
internal route control and LOC interdiction, to do so would
require a better mapping effort.
An interrelated issue is that of paramilitary forces and
how the government should confront them as compared to
the traditional guerrilla groups. The spawning of the
anti-guerrilla paramilitary forces is an outgrowth of the
failure or inability of the state to meet an obligation to
protect persons and property from outlaw predation. It can
be cogently argued that a system of local paramilitary
defense structures is, if not a requirement for winning an
irregular war, at least an historically successful element.45
The debate regarding the establishment of a disciplined
community defense system is beyond the purposes of this
monograph; nevertheless, the question of civil self-defense
rarely fails to enter debates about what kind of strategy
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should apply to Colombia’s war. The observation that
guerrilla forces, at the moment of potential government
victory, universally slouch back into a latency of civilian
garb and popular protection impels the argument for
community organizations that can spot and report
guerrillas organizing and metamorphosing. As imposing as
this historical tendency may be, the political and
propagandistic climate in Colombia does not yet appear ripe
for re-engagement of civilian communities in such a way.
Having said that, an apparently grassroots movement of
resistance to guerrilla violence has bloomed in a few areas,
and this phenomenon may present a vehicle for local
organized resistance to outlaws in select areas.46 The
question, therefore, of local militias has not dissipated, and
U.S. posture regarding their creation must be better
informed by facts on the ground.
The existence of the AUC is attributable in some
measure to the failure of the government to establish
effective discipline and to crisply delineate the authority
and range of initiative accorded to civil defense groups. The
juridical turn in Colombia against legal establishment of
militias is generally attributed to excesses in their
vigilantism, to put it coldly. Moreover, the virulence of the
self-defense movement can be associated more broadly with
two factors. One is the failure of the Colombian state to
defeat and remove the guerrillas, which have become the
raison d’etre of the AUC. The second is the early lack of
commitment to destroy the illicit drug industry, which
provides autonomous financial power to outlawry and
corrupts the enforcement regime. Had the government of
Colombia reformed the controls and linkages over the
several types of authorized militias, and maintained a
participation in their existence and discipline, it is unlikely
they would have as close an intermarriage with drug
trafficking that they now do. Because many in and outside
Colombia consider the establishment of a militia system to
be an effective and legitimate part of counterguerrilla
strategy, it behooves U.S. planners to be informed about the
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home communities and memberships of any future militia.
Such information can be optimally gleaned from cadastral
and land registry records.
Mapping.
It is hard to understand how, after 30 years of internal
conflict, there is so much unmapped territory in Colombia,
and that the existing maps are so out of date. Partly to
blame is a bureaucratic distancing of the state’s geographic
interest and function from military identity. Until 1950, the
Colombian national geographic institute was called the
Augustín Codazzi Military and Geographic Institute
(Instituto Geográfico y Militar Augustín Codazzi or IGAC).
The name change followed the movement of Colombia’s
mapping responsibilities out of the defense ministry in
1940, thus creating South America’s first civilian
geographic institute.47 The change permitted growth of an
institutional attitude that correlates technical objectivity
with neutrality in the face of the guerrilla war—not showing
favoritism toward either the guerrilla or the army. Such a
construction of objectivity is anathema to the wisdom that a
governmental strategy must be integral, employ all
strengths and prerogatives of the state, and establish
conditions under which the causes of disaffection can be
positively resolved. An institutional attitude that eschews
identity with the army under a claim of scientific
nonpartisanship is, in this case, especially damaging to a
war effort because the product of the geographic institute is
central to the prosecution of so many other government
functions. The geographic work of the state must be both
loyal and active in the promotion of state authority. As it
stands, the cadastral function of the Colombian government
has at times favored the sovereign challenges of the
guerrillas, not opposed them.48 The cadastral office and all
the cadastral records must be made to represent the
contract that the government has with the people to uphold
rights in land. Winning an internal war requires that the
whole gamut of government enterprises and every aspect of
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a nation’s power be used to a common end. In the context of
an internal war, when it comes to the cartographic function
of the state, there can be no logical distinction between
military and nonmilitary effort.49 Cartography supports the
whole range of state interests, from the most immediate
combat needs to long-term pacification and development,
but it must in any case be comprehensive and current.
The developmental importance of cadastral mapping is
not lost on Colombians in a position to know. The chief of the
cadastral office of the Colombian geographic institute wrote
a 2001 essay outlining the long-range goals of his office and
asserting the importance of his organization’s mission.50
The InterAmerican Development Bank, in turn, has
supported the government of Colombia, although haltingly,
with generous loan agreements. Work on the modernization
of the cadaster has proceeded, but at an inadequate rate.
Cadastral coverage, responsibility, and authority in
Colombia is divided into five major parts, the national
cadastral office and four independent cadastral offices
(Federal District of Bogotá, Antioquia, Medellín, and
Cali).51 The existence of the independent cadastral offices is
related to historic anti-federalism. The offices are
politically, administratively and fiscally independent, but
they take technical guidance from the national cadastral
office and follow the same general technical protocols.
Technical and professional conditions among the cadastral
offices are not uniform, and unification of the offices is not
foreseen.
The cadastral offices are responsible for appraising land
values as these appraisals are the basis of equitable
taxation. The tax rates vary as a percentage of market value
and no general figure for the relationship between the
appraised value and market value would be broadly
accurate. According to many familiar with the system of
appraisals and the market for real property, an appraisal of
around 50 percent of market value would be typical in a
normal (not affected by the violence) market. The cadastral
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offices keep records of the size, location, use, potential use,
and tax currency of all properties. In order to fulfill all the
requirements of Colombian administrative law, a seller
must produce a certification from the cadastral office
showing the precise boundaried description and location of
land to be sold, as well as any tax debt. This process seems to
be followed as an exception, however, in many rural areas,
and often in the city.
The cadastral offices, meanwhile, are not the official
record of ownership of a property. That function belongs to
the registry offices of a separate ministry, the Superintendency of Notaries and Registries.52 In the course of
transactions in land, new owners consider it sufficient to
register a bill of sale in the registry, but often without
consulting the cadastral office or having received a
certificate of description and tax appraisal from the seller.
The cadastral records, while determinant of the location,
shape, size, and tax value of a piece of land, are not sufficient
to establish legally definitive ownership. Furthermore, an
unknown percentage of the land sales in rural areas are
legally insufficient (might not be ratified or enforced by the
courts).
The cadastral office records historically have not been
compatible with the registry files. That is to say, until
recently there was no common field of data that made the
two sets of files reconcilable. Even descriptions of location
and size have not always been of the same type in both
record sets. It may be that in the course of reconciling the
two sets of land records, thousands of inconsistencies arise.
Recent efforts by national and international agencies to
systematize the cadastral and registry files did not
establish a method of records reconciliation. Today, at least
there is a technical intention and a technical method for so
doing. Each of the millions of properties listed in the registry
file carries an identification number, and this number is
gradually being assigned to corresponding properties in the
cadastral files. This process promises some quantity of legal
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challenge and dispute; however, it is generally conceded
that, in the long run, the two files must be reconciled.
Creating basic ownership and survey data in unmapped
areas is an additional challenge, especially where security
for surveyors and interviewers is complicated. Still, the
opportunity to do original cadastral formation in areas of
greatest illicit cultivation should be seen as golden.53 There
is no place in Colombia where cartography, cadastral
formation, and digitization of registry files cannot be
speedily accomplished, although in some areas this may
require direct military or police escort for the protection of
administrators, surveyors, and other technicians. While the
creation of files and precise mapping does not assure
effective government presence and authority in outlaw
areas, the creation of digital files (with their characteristic
permanence and visibility) provides a useful tool for
extension of government presence and authority.54
The Colombian government is attempting to formalize
land ownership throughout the country and to digitize the
related data.55 As it is now, results of that effort will not be
realized for several years at best. Moreover, there is a strong
possibility that the resulting data will not be totally
transparent, or not provided in a timely and comprehensive
manner to U.S. Government agencies. A multi-agency
program of assistance can be implemented to accelerate the
Colombian government cadastral program, foster and
monitor transparency, and gain timely use of digitized and
digitally mapped description, ownership, use, and value
data for property throughout Colombia. Most of this data
would be necessarily unclassified, openly obtainable, and
could be made available to the full range of participating
agencies. A portion of the data could be made available on a
public Internet site for use by interested scholars.
U.S. Government decisions regarding Colombia,
whether related to counternarcotics, countert e r r o r i sm , e c o no m i c d ev el o p m ent , m i l i t a r y
operations, long-term peace or otherwise, are not
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well-taken unless fully informed regarding the
ownership of real property. Only a few years ago such an
assertion would have been not only curious but
unreasonable—not so much because property ownership
did not influence political actors in foreign countries, but
rather because such intelligence could rarely be had. Even if
U.S. decisionmakers would like to have had better
information about who owned what in foreign countries, the
intelligence challenge was generally insurmountable, at
least beyond the most immediate and anecdotal
investigation. Today, property data can be collected,
organized, analyzed, and presented in ways that can
support foreign policy and strategy. A convergence of new
technologies, including global positioning satellites, and
expanding technical protocols such as the National Spatial
Data Infrastructure, makes provision of detailed property
information practicable.
The Upshot.
Among the uses of real property information discussed
above were support to military tactics and territorial control
strategies, asset forfeiture or denial; precision eradication
of illicit crops; prediction and prevention of human rights
violations; corruption limitation, long-term capital creation,
alternative development contract monitoring; and
improved understanding and expression regarding the
ultimate effect of policies and projects. Other uses include
money-laundering tip-off, avoidance of collateral damage in
military operations, improved disaster relief planning,
support to ecological protection strategies, and equitable
tax assessment practices.
Of all the uses of property data, however, perhaps the
farthest-reaching derives from the potential to map market
values. Almost all the individual holdings in Colombia have
been assigned a tax appraisal that responds to the essential
purpose of the cadastre as a tax base record. It is feasible to
obtain detailed market assessment appraisals throughout
most of the country that would allow a comparison of
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market prices to the tax appraisals. With such information
we could create a map that would reflect the condition of
human rights in Colombia. As argued earlier, real property
is a set of rights (and duties) associated with a place. The
fuller the set of rights, the more valuable the place. The
more stable and better protected the rights, the more
valuable the place. Not only will land values rise generally
in Colombia when the war is over, but the value of
individual pieces of land will increase or decrease in relation
to the quality of rights enjoyed. If persons can travel and live
safely, the market prices of their lands will increase. We will
be able to see on a map, in color and in detail, the quality and
stability of rights as they improve or diminish. Of course
this is important for knowing if civilization is winning or
losing against outlawry, but it may be more important as an
engine for a sea change in U.S. foreign policy. The
inhumanities that energize American foreign policy are the
violent consequences of underlying conditions, conditions
that by themselves failed to generate emotional energy.
Violent symptoms rather than underlying causes become
the focal point of policy. By better appreciating property, we
can consider a broader range of contested rights and duties
that lead to grave violations of human rights. Even in
relation to the most serious human rights abuses, property
issues will be identified as causes. Few abuses are not
rooted in competitions for property. Unfortunately, when
dealing with international human rights, the problem
becomes one of metering the status of human beings not
only to the extent that their property rights are being
protected, but to the extent that they themselves are being
treated as property.
In every civilized society property rights must be carefully
safeguarded; ordinarily and in the great majority of cases,
human rights and property rights are fundamentally and in the
long run, identical; but when it clearly appears that there is a
real conflict between them, human rights must have the upper
hand; for property belongs to man and not man to property.56
Theodore Roosevelt
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Accepting President Roosevelt’s observation, U.S.
foreign policy toward Colombia and elsewhere need not veer
away from human rights discipline, but should refocus on
the erosion of liberty and property that precede gross
violations. A map of the quality of rights in Colombia can be
made, and that map will show progress (or lack of it) against
the underlying causes of gross human rights violations
there.57
Colombia’s government has not done enough to make
land ownership precise and transparent, and therefore not
enough to control corruption and reduce disillusionment.
The problem may owe to an underestimate of the
importance of formalized land ownership as a fundamental
mechanism for social peace and honest government.
Recently, Colombians overwhelmingly elected a candidate
who announced his intention to mobilize the Colombian
nation to take an aggressive stance against the guerrillas.
His treatment of the AUC is more of a question mark. In the
face of U.S. desire to assist Colombia to rid itself of all
terrorist groups and to curb corruption, the United States
needs new, more detailed information—not just anecdotal,
but strategically relevant, comprehensive data about who
gains and loses in Colombia when major decisions are made.
Success for Colombia in dealing with organized outlaws,
and in establishing the conditions for long-term peace,
depends on gaining a better understanding of the details of
ownership in Colombia. To influence the course of
Colombian change, the United States would be well-served
to know who specifically benefits from the redistribution of
interests in land. To succeed at counternarcotics, the United
States must know more about who owns illicit cultivation
and how, and about geographic values beyond the crop
areas themselves. A complete map of Colombia is needed,
one that comprehends ownership and assists in the creation
of stable property. The United States can support its
creation and encourage its transparency.
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The measures of effectiveness applied in determining
the success or failure of U.S. and Colombian government
policies also need to be improved. It will be useful to keep
track of quantities of illicit drugs grown, shipped, or
sprayed. Effectiveness in healing the Colombian state and
society, however, must be measured in other ways. One
indicator ought to be the value, in detail, of Colombian
land.58 When Colombia begins to enjoy widespread, regular
increases in rural property values, it will be one of the surest
indicators that its war has been won.
The upshot of these observations about the nature and
significance of property and property mapping in Colombia
is clear. The government of Colombia, at U.S. insistence
backed by U.S. aid, should formalize all land ownership in
Colombia as soon as possible, make land ownership and
value information completely and readily available,
challenge concentrations of ownership in the hands of
outlaws, and incorporate real property purchases and
d i s t r i b u t i on i n t o i t s o w n c o u n t e r n ar c o t i c s an d
counterterrorist strategy. All this will contribute to a
stronger Colombian State with a visible commitment not
just to security, but also to civil rights and open government.
To restate:

·
·

A positive correlation between formal land ownership
and material progress exists;

·

A complementary relationship between formal land
ownership and social peace exists;

·

Informally owned and unregulated land ownership
favors illicit land use and violence;

·

Property manipulation is an overlooked dimension of
outlaw political and military strategies;
Collection of property information on a strategic scale
is practicable because of new technologies; and,
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·

Property information supports law enforcement,
military, developmental, economic, and diplomatic
decisions and programs.

Therefore, if we are to expend more human and financial
capital on Colombia, we should assure that Colombian land
is thoroughly mapped.
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1. On the history of agricultural and extractive products as a factor
in Colombian conflict, see, for instance, Frank Safford and Marco
Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002. See also, generally, Indalecio Lievano
Aguirre, Los Grandes Conflictos Sociales y Economicos de Nuestra
Historia, Bogotá: Círculo de Lectores, 2002.
2. This theme of conflict over cash products and their geography is
not at odds with another common thread in the literature of Colombian
conflict—the struggle for control of labor. Colombian labor sources,
whether indigenous populations, imported slaves, or otherwise, have
been variously courted and abused for the purposes of exploiting
product or controlling terrain. Thus the two themes are interwoven and
complementary. The political assumptions and preferences of
Colombian authors seem often to correlate with one theme or the other.
Those Colombian authors focusing on human exploitation tend to favor
socialist solutions. See, for instance, María Clemencia Ramírez, Entre el
estado y la guerrilla: identidad y ciudadanía en el movimiento de los
campesinos del Putumayo (Between the State and the Guerrilla:
Identity and Citizenship in the Campesino Movement in Putumayo),
Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2002; Orlando
Fals Borda, Historia de la cuestión agraria en Colombia, Bogotá: Carlos
Valencia Editores, 1982; Margarita González, El Resguardo en el Nuevo
Reino de Granada, Bogotá: El Áncora Editores, 1992.
3. The author does not cite illicit drug profits as the characteristic
distinguishing the current struggle from those of Colombia’s past,
although this is clearly important to the scale of the problem. Rather,
the key difference between today’s civil conflict and its predecessors is
the imported nature of the ideological base of the rebel (FARC and ELN)
projects. The ostensible argument of the guerrillas is not rooted in the
traditional Colombian federalist—anti-federalist—debate, but rather
in class struggle. It may be that the un-Colombian nature of the
argument is part of the reason that the guerrilla has seemed to loose
ideological compass. Interestingly, there is a new and growing body of

31

political literature in Colombia that emphasizes regional and territorial
issues, advocating the reshuffling of administrative political units of the
state. Even those writings inspired by socialism seem less taken by
class-consciousness than by the traditional Colombian centrifugal
quarrel. See, for instance, “Conflicto, Autonomia Regional y Socialismo
Ecológico” (“Conflict, Regional Autonomy and Ecological Socialism”) or
“Descentralizar para Pacificar” (“Decentralize to Pacify”) in Agenda
Ciudadana, Las claves territoriales de la guerra y la paz, desarrollo
regional, participación ciudadana y agenda de paz (The Territorial
Clues to the War and Peace, Regional Development, Citizen
Participation and the Peace Agenda), Bogotá: Agenda Ciudadana y
Cátedra para la Paz, 2000; Jaime Castro, La Question Territorial,
Bogotá, Oveja Negra, 2002; and Orlando Fals Borda, Kaziyadu: Registro
del Reciente Despertar Territorial en Colombia (Kaziyadu: Record of the
Recent Territorial Awakening in Colombia), Bogotá: Ediciones desde
abajo, 2001; Alejo Vargas, “La guerra por el control territorial” (“The
war for territorial control”), El Espectador, November 17, 1998, p. 4A;
“Guerrilla exigirá derecho a gobernar territorios” (“The Guerrillas Will
Demand Right to Govern Territories”), El Espectador, November 16,
1998, p. 6A.
4. The roots of these two communist guerrilla groups reach back to
at least the early 1960s. See, on the history of the Colombian guerrillas,
Michael Radu, Violence and the Latin American Revolutionaries, New
Brunswick, 1988; Russell W. Ramsey, Guerrilleros y Soldados, Segunda
Edición, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 2000; Cordillera Editores,
Historia de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia: Ejército, Tomo III,
Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana, 1993, pp. 124-141; Eduardo Pizarro
Leongómez, Las FARC: 1949-1966, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1992; Carlos
Medina Gallego, ELN: Una historia de los orígenes, Bogotá: Rodriguez
Quito, 2001. The AUC is another illegal, armed irregular force popularly
described as “paramilitary” and as “right wing,” although it has made
few ideological statements beyond opposition to the communist
guerrillas. For more on this organization, see David Spencer,
Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force? Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001; Maurico
Aranguren Molina, Mi Confesión: Carlos Castaño revela sus secretos,
Bogotá: Editorial Oveja Negra, 2001; “Place” as used here alludes to a
body of theory in the study of geography, a centerpiece of which is called
“central place theory,” that considers competitive weeding-out and
survival of businesses. Associated normally with urban economics and
geography, place theory has obvious application in Colombia. See, in
this regard, http://geography.about.com/cs/centralplace.
5. For a brief description of Colombia’s current “contending forces,”
their methods, and goals, see generally Max G. Manwaring, Nonstate

32

Actors in Colombia: Threat and Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
6. Alfred Tennyson, Alfred Tennyson Selected Poetry: Edited, with
an Introduction by Douglas Smith, New York: Random House, 1951, p.
307.
7. The type and quality of tenancy, mortgager, renter, sharecropper,
etc., often arises in analyses of Colombian agricultural reform, and
tenancy conditions are highly varied even within a single department.
Quality of land ownership in Nariño is typically varied, as a thematic
map of tenancy there indicates. See Instituto Geográfico Agustín
Codazzi, Análisis geográficos: Aspectos geográficos del sector Andino
Nariñense, Bogotá: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 1982, p. 26.
8. Yovanny Arturo Martinez and Nyrian Angelica Ubáque, El
catastro del nuevo milenio, Bogotá: Instituto Geográfico Augustín
Codazzi, 2001, p. 1
9. This is actually a digitized composite of two cadastral maps
featuring the county seat and surroundings of Tablón (a municipio or
county) in Nariño Department in southwestern Colombia.
10. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, New York: Perseus
Books Group, 2000.
11. Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in
the Third World, New York, Harper & Row, 1989.
12. On the subject of public information transparency, see Luz
Estella Nagle, The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan
Colombia: Reforming Judicial Institutions — Again, Carlisle,
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
2002. “Transparency and accountability are essential to good
governance. They will discourage nepotism and curb the bestowing of
favors on family and friends.” Ibid., p. 8.
13. Numerous unclassified maps of FARC dispositions have been
published in recent years. Among the best are Alvaro Valencia Tovar,
“Ubicación Cuadrillas FARC” in Inseguridad y Violencia en Colombia,
Bogotá: Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 1997, p. 126; “Localización de los
frentes guerrilleros, 1995,” in Jesus Antonio Bejarano Avila, Colombia:
Inseguridad, violencia y desempeño económico en las areas rurales,
ibid., p. 119; Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, “Figure 4.3, Areas of
Expansion of FARC Activity, 1996-1997,” in Colombian Labyrinth: The

33

Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional
Stability, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, p. 49; a map image is also
available only from “The Center for International Policy’s Colombia
Project,” at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/farcmap.htm.
14. See Thomas Marks, Colombian Adaptation to FARC Insurgency,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002,
p. 16.
15. A 1961 U.S. Army Field Manual on irregular war states that,
“Surface lines of communication which have proved particularly
vulnerable to attack and sabotage should be abandoned, at least
temporarily, if at all possible. Long surface lines of communication
cannot be completely protected against a determined irregular force
without committing an excessive number of troops.” Department of the
Army Field Manual (FM) 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces,
Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1961, p. 23.
However sound this advice might have been in the context of the
conflicts contemplated by the authors at the time, this would be
disastrous advice for the Colombian situation and is rejected here.
Colombia’s urban centers depend on a limited number of long-haul road
routes. Colombia has the material wherewithal to not abandon legal
commerce to its fate on the nations major highways.
16. Personal interview of the author in February 2002 with
government officials who requested anonymity.
17. Colombia’s outlaws have property-awareness. They know what
property is most valuable and they know that property is a relationship
between land, people and government. They know further that accurate
records help govern. Outlaw leaders, especially guerrillas, understand
property as a contract between government and people—but they want
that contract to exist between Colombia’s countrymen and themselves,
not the democratically constituted government the United States
supports.
18. On the clearance zone or “despeje,” see Geoffrey Demarest, “In
Colombia: A Guerrilla Sanctuary?” Military Review, March-April 2002,
pp. 48-50.
19. The translated denotation of the word terrateniente is
landowner, but the connotation, especially in Colombia, is of an
arrogant holder of more land than justice should permit.
20. “Milicias se pelean a Medellín,” El Tiempo, May 23, 2002, pp. 1,
2.

34

21. The Atrato area has been an especially unfortunate victim of
mass civilian suffering and death. One of the worst human rights
offenses of the war occurred in late April 2002 at Bojayá in Chocó
Department. In the context of a battle with the AUC for control of the
area (the same general confrontation as that in Medellín), the FARC
launched a gas cylinder mortar/rocket that detonated in a packed
church killing at least 110 persons. See “Crece la pesadilla en Bojaya,”
El Tiempo, Bogotá, May 8, 2002, p. 1.
22. On the nature of property ownership, see Wesley Newcomb
Hofeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial
Reasoning, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919, reissued 1964;
Reinold Noyes, The Institution of Property, New York: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1936.
23. See, for instance, Jesus Antonio Bejarano Avila, Director of
Research, Colombia: Inseguridad, violencia y desempeño económico en
las areas rurales, Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia 1997, p.
225. This work includes extensive presentation of the relationship
between violence and rural land use and markets in Colombia.
24. In this vein, a U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) initiative stemming from the Summit of the Americas, the
Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative (IPSI) calls for the
governments of the Americas to incorporate alterative dispute
resolution mechanisms into their plans. It is understood that successful
local judicial and nonjudicial resolution of property conflicts depends on
reliable, open information regarding ownership. Assuring the fidelity
and permanence of public records is an obvious start point for building
systems for quieting title, ending dispute over ownership by court
decision. See “Virtual Office for the Inter-Summit Property Systems
Initiative” http://www.property-registration.org/Documents/
IPSI.htm.
25. Parallel works, such as John P. Powelson’s The Story of Land: A
World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, Cambridge, MA:
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1988, highlight correlations between
civil violence and informality in systems of property ownership; see also
Geoffrey Demarest, Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Security and
Property Rights, London: Frank Cass, 1998. In this book, the author
deals with the foreign policy and strategy aspects of property and
ownership theory. Of the American failure to attend to the question of
property in international affairs he states,
If, in all the lands where the United States regularly cites grave
human rights inadequacies, one were to ask simple questions

35

about landlord-tenant laws, title registry systems, zoning
ordinances, mining stakes, paving contracts, street gang
territories, paternity laws, or water courts, two judgments
would be reached. First, that powerful linkages exist between
violent abuses of human rights and contested property rights.
Second, that U.S. intelligence collectors, analysts, and
policymakers are indifferent to details of the ownership
environment.
26. Michael Hill, Black Sunday: Ploesti, London: Schiffer
Publishing, 2001; see also B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second
World War, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970, pp. 607-608; U.S. Air
Force Museum, WWII Combat Europe, Ploesti, Rumania Mission
Details, online at http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/
wwii/ce10.htm.
27. Except perhaps later in the war, when a comprehensive, near
simultaneous campaign against production facilities within Germany
had a devastating effect on supply. Therein, too, may lie an important
lesson. Eradication will be more successful in hurting guerrilla finances
to the extent it can be done massively and simultaneously throughout
the county. This may be practically impossible until the expanse of crop
areas and the complexity of the outlaw logistics routes are reduced.
28. These responses also show that eradication is having an effect,
and more than mere annoyance. Still, the effect could be worse than the
cure. See, for example, Juan Londoño M., “Violencia, peor que la broca”
(“Violence, Worse than the Blight”), El Tiempo, December 5, 2001.
Describing the effect of the war on the traditional coffee growing region,
the eje cafetero, Londoño reports on an increase in violence, including
the robbery of whole shipments of coffee beans by the guerrillas. Such
acts may be compensatory means of reacting to diminished coca
revenues. They raise a question about fencing. To convert coffee beans to
cash, the guerrilla organization must have in place the correct set of
owned or extorted businesses, and/or the right array of government
bribes.
29. For a relevant series of maps, see Geografía de la guerra, online
at http://www.disaster.info.desastres.net/desplazados/geografia/
indexmap.htm.
30. In addition, a sizeable percentage of the money spent on the
counternarcotics military portion of Plan Colombia was for helicopter
purchases. Helicopters, perhaps the single most accepted and
significant machine for overcoming terrain and time disadvantages in
irregular warfare, are to some extent fungible. Giving helicopters for the

36

purpose of counternarcotics frees others for different uses. In addition,
the semantic warp of counternarcotics vice counterinsurgency may, as
hoped, be ending. The helicopters will be available for broader,
counteroutlaw use.
31. Compare “Figure 3.2 Arms Smuggling Routes Into Colombia,” in
Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of
Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability, Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001, p. 36, citing the Colombian Ministry of
Defense, with Carlos Eduardo Jaramillo, “Principales rutas . . .,” in Los
Guerrilleros del Novecientos, Bogota: Fondo Editorial CEREC, 1991, pp.
286, 293.
32. One of the natural military advantages the FARC gained
included interior lines, rear area security, protected lines of
communication, protected financial resource bases, marshaling areas,
training areas, and access to strategic corridors, including into the
federal district of Bogotá. The propagandistic value cannot be
understated, either, propaganda and operational strategy being at some
point linked. The FARC has long made explicit arguments in favor of
belligerent status under international law. See, for instance,
“Beligerancia,” FARC-EP Documentos at http://www.farc-ep.org/. As
the FARC points out, application of the conventions (and with it a
strengthened argument for separate and legitimate international
identity) includes a requirement that the dissident armed force
“exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations. . . .” More
important still is the very fact of participating in a peace process while
carrying on its violent activities. Sitting at a peace negotiation lent the
FARC both legitimacy and media profile, especially overseas. Without
the peace process, the FARC image is diminished. The despeje and the
Pastrana peace process were so linked that elimination of the despeje
meant the end of the process and the political benefits to the FARC that
went with it. See Armando Borrero Mansilla, “La Importancia Militar
de la Zona del Despeje,” El Tiempo, October 19, 2001, online at
http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/19-10-2001/prip118531.html.
33. See Scott Wilson, “Colombian Rebels Use Refuge to Expand
Their Power Base: FARC Pushes Boundaries of Government-Backed
Safe Haven,” The Washington Post Online, October 3, 2001, p. A25, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/. “Envisioned as a way to end
Colombia’s nearly four-decade civil war, the FARC’s safe haven instead
has become the guerrillas’ single biggest military advantage in the
widening conflict, according to senior army officers and defense analysts
in Colombia.” Ibid.

37

34. “Colombia details fresh IRA link to guerrillas,” Financial Times,
September 17, 2001, online at http://ft.com. See also “IRA Denies
Sending Trio to Colombia,” Agence France Presse, Wednesday,
September 19, 2001, online at http://www.prairienet.org/clm/
clmnews_files/010919AFP01.html>. The long-standing issue of Cuban
government sponsorship of Colombian subversive groups should regain
currency. See, for instance, Ninoska Pérez Castellón, “The Cuban
Connection,” Latin American Special Report, Vol. 12, No. 11, September
30, 2001, p. 1.
35. “Mi Única Prioridad no es la Paz.” Interview with President
Andrés Pastrana, Semana, February 26, 2001, p. 30.
36. Ibid.
37. These counties are Yondó, Antioquia; Cantagallo, Bolivar; and
San Pablo, Bolivar. The Magdalena River itself was not to be included
and, according to President Pastrana, the time would be limited to 9
months. For a detailed description of outlaw competition for the area,
including a series of maps describing Magdalena Medio, see
Vicepresidencia de la República, Programa Actual del Magdalena
Medio, Current Program on the Middle Magdalena) online at
http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio/04_publicaciones
/04_03_regiones/magdalenamedio/index.htm. For a chronology of the
Pastrana government’s policy regarding the ELN, see also
Departamento de Comunicaciones, Oficina del Alto Comisionado de
paz, Santa fé de Bogotá, Colombia, Hechos de Paz (Peace Facts), online
at
http://www.he c h os d e paz .g ov.c o/ e s / l oad .ph p/ u i d = 0 /
leng=es/5/cronologia_eln00.htm.
38. Vicepresidencia de la República, Ibid.
39. Thrusts to seize control of the big river mark most of Colombia’s
civil wars. Typical was an early incursion by Liberal (rebel) forces at the
outset of the War of the Thousand Days. On October 24, 1899, at a
mid-river turn called Los Obispos, a group of rebels led by Baranquilla
doctor Julio Vengoechea sank one of their own paddleboats and watched
the government gunboat Hercules sink the rest. The rebel plan to wrest
the Middle Magdalena was well-conceived, but botched. See Geoffrey
Demarest, “War of the Thousand Days,” Small Wars and Insurgencies,
Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 7.
40. Knowledge of ownership by plat in southern Bolivar Department
would not likely point directly to those responsible for drug cultivation,
although it might indeed. It is more likely that ownership information
such as residency of absentee owners or hometowns of mortgage banks

38

might tend to prove or disprove territorial theories concerning the lack
of material progress in the area. One popular hypothesis holds that the
departmental capital is simply too distant from the southern cone of
Bolivar. It would be interesting to see, by way of the property ownership
records, what the relative connection of the agriculturalists in the area
is to the departmental capital of Cartagena on the Atlantic coast. See
Orlando Fals Borda, Región e Historia: Elementos sobre ordenamiento y
equilibrio regional en Colombia, Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1996, p. 9.
41. Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria—Incora, Colombia
Tierra y Paz: Experiencias y caminos para la reforma agraria,
altrenativas para el siglo XXI, 1961-2001, Bogota: Incora, 2002, pp. 174,
175. This work contains several essays relating the agrarian reform
efforts of Incora to social problems, including violence, facing Colombia.
The essays should be compared to those in an earlier Incora publication,
Marta Rojas, editor, Tierra, Economia, y Sociedad, Bogota: Incora,
1993.
42. Ibid., p. 187.
43. Author interview of Colombian government officials who
requested anonymity. Incora is the acronym of the Colombian Institute
for Agrarian Reform, Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria.
44. The policy of the Clinton administration was formalized in
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 73, dated August 3, 2000, that
stated in relevant part,
The primary focus of the Colombia initiative is to provide
support for Colombia’s intensifying counterdrug effort. As a
matter of Administration policy, we will not support Colombian
counterinsurgency efforts. We will, however, provide support, in
accordance with existing authorities and this policy, to the
Government of Colombia for force protection and for security
directly related to counterdrug efforts, regardless of the source
of the threat. This Administration remains convinced that the
ultimate solution to Colombia’s long-standing civil conflict is
through a successful peace process, not a decisive military
victory, and believes that counterdrug progress will contribute
to progress towards peace.
For a more recent U.S. government statement regarding the Colombian
situation, except in counterterrorism terms, see U.S. Department of
State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Department of State Publication
10940, Washington: Office of the Secretary of State, 2002, pp. 45-47.

39

45. See, for instance, Spencer; Ibid. note 4.
46. See Susannah A. Nesmith, “Colombian Rebels Face New
Adversary,” Associated Press, Thursday, January 3, 2002, online at
http://www.prairienet.org/clm/clmnews_files/020103AP01.html;
“Rebeldes con causa,” Semana, November 19-26, 2001, No. 1020, p. 32;
“La Resistencia,” Ibid., p. 54.
47. Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, Agustin Codazzi
Geographic Institute, Bogotá: IGAC, 2002, institutional information
folder.
48. Failure to pull in one direction is not limited to the Colombian
government. If the U.S. Agency for International Development embarks
on an alternative crop development project, the goals are both
developmental and counternarcotic. If a deal is made with local
agriculturalists in which agricultural and financial assistance is
exchanged for a promise not to grow coca, the United States should be
fully informed regarding the nature of the deal. What exactly are the
rights in land held by the individual farmer? Is he a sharecropper? Is he
beholden for rent, or is he subject to an unregistered mortgage? To
whom is he beholden for protection of his basic rights of peaceful
possession? Are all interests in the land registered and verifiable? No
aid project could be useful to the strengthening of the contract between
the duly constituted government and the population if that project
serves a different contract—a forced contract between the peasant and
the outlaw. Nevertheless, it appears that many U.S. aid programs are
underinformed regarding the status of local property. In some project
areas not even basic cartography exists, and the property contract of the
peasants appears to be with the guerrillas or paramilitaries rather than
with the government.
49. Other observers have noted that the Colombian state is at odds
with itself and so is its war effort. See Dennis M. Rempe, The Past as
Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia,
1958-66, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. “The violence in
Colombia requires an integrated strategy that addresses the social,
economic, political, and military dynamics of the problem.” Ibid. p. 31;
“We can talk of nothing until the government actually exercises its writ
within its national territory. This will come about only through a
combination of military and socio-economic means.” Marks, Ibid., note
18, p. 31; “Colombia as a system is not involved in its own struggle.
Though commendable initiative has been shown by some government
organizations, others . . . have proceeded as though an internal war was
not raging.” Ibid., p. 32.

40

50. Yovanny Arturo Martinez; Ibid., note 10.
51. The national cadastral office is a directorate of the national
cartographic institute, Instituto Geográfico Augustín Codazzi, which is
a dependency of the Ministry of Interior and Public Credit, Ministerio de
Hacienda y Crédito Público.
52. Real property registrars are named to all of the departmental
capitals and to a number of other cities. Registrars to the departmental
capitals are named directly by the President of the Republic. Registrars
are subordinate administratively to the Superintendency of Notaries
and Registries, Superintendencia de Notarios y Registros, and those
registrars named to nondepartmental capitals are generally named by
the Superintendent, who is in turn appointed by the President. The
Superintendency is subordinate to the Ministry of Law and Justice,
Ministerio de Justicia y Derecho. The registrars direct the registry
offices, known as Offices of the Registry of Public Instruments, Oficinas
de Registro de Instrumentos Públicos, which are organized into what are
called Registry Circles, Círculos Registrales, and into which may fall
several to many counties, municipios. That is to say, only about one in
ten counties has a registry office.
53. Original ownership adjudication presents the government with
an opportunity to create property in the hands of persons most likely to
oppose invasion by illicit interests. This opportunity, however, has not
being exploited. Agrarian land redistribution decisions mostly have not
been guided by counternarcotics, counterterrorist, market, or for that
matter, even ecological considerations. Land redistribution programs
should be made to fit into the overall government counternarcotics,
counterterrorist and land-use strategies. Failure to do this has been a
critical (and, unfortunately, willful) omission on the part of the
Colombian government.
54. Developing a modern, formal land ownership regime is a larger,
more difficult objective than that of creating or obtaining property data.
A modern property regime includes mechanisms for trust-building and
for market fluidity. These mechanisms include title insurance; a
regulated brokerage profession; professional property inspectors and
appraisers; statutorily specific “quiet title” actions; clearly delineated
occasions for self-help in regaining possession; enforceable
punishments for unlawful self-help; enforcement of restraining orders
and eviction; transparency of ownership files; well-publicized
statutes-of-fraud that require transactions in real estate to be in
writing, signed, notarized, and registered; requirement that mortgages
and encumbrances of all kinds be recorded or be without state
enforcement; and so on. This litany of needs is included to underline an

41

important disclaimer: creating property data (even if is technically
exact, judicially correct, and accessible) is not the same as creating a
property regime similar to that known in the United States.
55. Cadastral maps and data do not constitute all the government
property data readily available in Colombia. A variety of government
offices maintain other geographically referenced data. For instance,
ECOPETROL, the national petroleum company, maintains a variety of
map data layers that include pipeline easements, exploration licences,
areas of geologic promise, etc. INGEOMINAS, the national mining and
mineralogical institute, has similar map data on valuable minerals.
Other agencies maintain ecological and agricultural data, and the
National Police keeps a massive geographically coded database of
incidents that could be displayed on a common map with the property
information using software such as ESRI ArcGIS.
56. Theodore Roosevelt, speech at the University of Paris, April 23,
1910, found in Daniel B. Baker, ed., Political Quotations, Detroit: Gale
Research Inc., 1990, p. 201.
57. Violations of human rights most decried by our government and
by private citizens working through nongovernmental organizations
include lack of habeas corpus, torture, organized rape, extrajudicial
execution, forced exile, disenfranchisement, and genocide. Any
situation involving the violation of human rights could be expressed in
ownership terms, but with reference to these most serious violations,
the use of property terminology might sterilize or routinize descriptions.
At that point, the relative utility of a property-based description of
events and conflicts would be exceeded. Observation of the close linkage
between denied property rights and evolution of basic human rights
abuses is most important in defending broad attention to property
rights in the analysis of national and international security affairs.
58. Colombia has a sufficiently competent and knowledgeable
quantity of land appraisers, organized into a national professional
federation, that it is feasible to implement a methodology for
determining market values of land in most areas of the country.

42

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert R. Ivany
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven Metz
Author
Dr. Geoffrey Demarest
Director of Publications
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby

